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DISCUSSION 
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS ARE VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS IN THEIR 
ADOPTION OF THE MAJORITY INTERPRETATION OF 
"APPEARANCE" UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES. 
A. Federal Courts Have Overwhelmingly Followed the Majority 
Approach. 
Nearly every federal court to consider the issue has ruled that an "appearance" 
requiring notice to defaulting parties is not limited to so-called "formal appearances.*" 
Courts in every federal circuit, excepting the 7th Circuit, have expressly recognized that 
an "appearance" under the federal rules includes any "informal" act that demonstrates a 
"clear purpose to defend the suit." (See Appellant's Br. at 8-11.) 
In its opening brief. River Crossings cited to twenty federal cases across eleven 
circuits, wherein federal courts expressly adopted this majority view. kl. To that list. 
River Crossings now adds in this brief an additional thirteen cases, including cases 
demonstrating that the 4th, 10th. and 11th Circuits also follow the majority approach, as 
discussed in detail below. 
In contrast, Arbogast has cited to only three cases which it argues have followed 
the so-called minority view. The first case was from the 7th Circuit, which River 
Crossings concedes is the only circuit that does not follow the majority approach. 
The second case, Town & Country Kids, Inc. v. Protected Venture Inv. Trust #1, 
Inc., 178 F.R.D. 453, 455 (E.D. Va. 1998), came from the 4th Circuit and likewise seems 
to have followed the minority position. However, it appears that every other court in the 
4th Circuit to have considered the issue has adopted the majority view, including the 4l 
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Circuit Court of Appeals. See, e ^ ; Mobil Oil Co. v. Jimenez. 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 
26981 *7 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpub.) (noting that ''general appearance will arise by 
implication as a result of any objective manifestation of an intent to defend or contest the 
action"); Starr Consulting, Inc. v. Global Resources Corp.. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90994 
*7 (M.D.N.C.) (holding that settlement negotiations and phone calls between the parties 
demonstrated intent to defend that suit and constituted an appearance): U.S. v. Smith, 212 
F.R.D. 480, 481 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (holding untimely answer showed "intent to defend the 
case and constitutes an appearance"); IntM Thomson Pub., Inc. v. Softquad Intl. Inc.. 190 
F.R.D. 395, 398 (E.D.N.C. 1998) ("Courts have broadly construed the word 'appear." 
allowing 'appearances by implication" when there is an 'objective manifestation of intent 
on the part of the defendant or counsel to defend the action.""); Trust Co. Bank v. 
Tingen-Millford Draper/ Co., Inc., 119 F.R.D. 21, 22-23 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (finding 
appearance by implication where defendant's counsel discussed, but was not granted, an 
extension of time to answer because request demonstrated intention of defending suit). 
Therefore, although Arbogast claims that Town & Country Kids was the "benchmark 
case" from the 4th Circuit, in reality it is merely a district court aberration. (Appellee Br. 
at 8n.7.) 
The third case cited by Arbogast as adopting the minority view in the 3r Circuit, 
in fact, did not. As explained in detail in the eminent Wright & Miller treatise, although 
Port-Wide Container Co., Inc. v. Interstate Maint. Corp., 440 F.2d 1195 (3rd Cir. 1971), 
appears to be inconsistent with the H.F. Livermore case and its majority approach, "there 
is an important distinction between these two cases." Wright, Miller & Kane, 10A Fed. 
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Prac. & Proc. Civil 3d §2686 at 46. In Port-Wide, the plaintiffs counsel had hand-
delivered a letter to the defendant's secretary containing notice of his intention to file for 
default. Because the defendant's secretary' was fired that day. she never passed the notice 
on to the defendant. 
Thus, in Port-Wide, the court seems to be saying that notice 
was properly given. As result, it was unnecessary for the 
court to determine whether defendant had appeared in the 
action in order to impose a notice requirement. 
Id. at 46-47 (emphasis added). 
The fact that other, and more recent. 3rd Circuit courts have followed the majority 
approach in defining an appearance under the Federal Rules lends further credence to 
Wright & Miller's reading of the Port-Wide case. For example, the most recent case out 
of the 3rd Circuit Caesar v. Firstbank Puerto Rico, 49 V.I. 1041 (D. V.I. 2008), expressly 
adopts the majority view: 
Traditionally, an appearance requires some filing with or 
actual physical appearance before the court. However, an 
appearance by implication for the purposes of rule 55 can 
arise as a result of an objective manifestation of intent on the 
part of the defendant or counsel to defend the action. Hence 
while a party may formally appear in an action by filing a 
notice of appearance with the court, a party may also make an 
appearance by implication, by indicating to the moving party 
a clear purpose to defend the suit. 
Id. at 1045 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
Furthermore, in support of its holding, the Caesar court cited to three other 3rd 
Circuit cases which followed the majority approach, including Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 
913 (3d Cir. 1966), wherein the 3d Circuit Court of Appeals "found that a telephone call 
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from defendant's counsel to plaintiffs senior counsel agreeing to an extension of time 
was sufficient to meet the appearance standard of Rule 55(b)(2)." Caesar. 49 V.I at 1046; 
see also Natasha C. v. Visionquest. Ltd.. 2003 U S. Dist. LEXIS 14631 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 
(holding that correspondence and telephone conversations between the parties' respective 
counsel was appearance by implication): FROF Inc v. Harris. 695 F. Supp 827. 830 (E.D. 
Pa. 1988) (finding an appearance by implication where defendant's counsel sent a letter 
to plaintiffs counsel disputing service of the complaint and summons). The 3r Circuit 
stands firmly in the majority camp on this issue. 
In the 2nd Circuit, although Arbogast is correct that the Court of Appeals has not 
yet ruled on the issue, it appears that every other 2n Circuit court to consider the matter 
has sided strongly and affirmatively with the majority approach.1 For example, in Gould 
v. Financialweb.com. Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2093 7 (S.D.N.Y.) the court declared 
as follows: 
Construing the phrase "appeared in the action," courts have 
found that it applies in many situations where the defendant 
has not made a formal appearance. The common thread 
seems to be that if a party has expressed—explicitly or 
implicitly—an intent to defend (rather than an intent to ignore 
the lawsuit and default as a litigation strategy), then equity 
1
 Arbogast wrongly accuses River Crossings of improperly citing to New York v. 
Green, 420 F.3d 99 (2nd Cir. 2005), for the proposition that the 2 n f Circuit Court of 
Appeals had affirmatively adopted the majority view. (Appellee's Br. at 17-18.) That is 
simply not true. River Crossings never claimed that the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
that case or any other, had adopted the majority view. The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals 
is notably absent from the lengthy string cite in River Crossings' opening brief^showing 
the federal courts of appeals and select district courts that had followed the majority 
approach. (See Appellant's Br. at 8-10.) River Crossings only cited to New York v. 
Green for its succinct explanation of the two approaches and their respective adherents. 
IcL at 3, 8. 
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compels the plaintiff to give the defendant notice of a motion 
for a default judgment. 
Id. at *12-13 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
Also, in Sexton v. M V. Silver Happiness. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 *9-10 
(E.D.N.Y). the district court analyzed the issue at length, citing to numerous authorities 
for the proposition that "the law does not require a formal appearance." Id. 
When faced with an informal response to a complaint, courts 
have routinely found that an appearance has been made. 
Id. In holding that a request for an extension of time to file an answer constituted an 
appearance under the federal rules, the Sexton court explained that "the broader 
principle—that informal contacts may constitute an appearance triggering notice under 
the federal rules—is well-established." Id. at * 11; see also Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia LLC v. Beers Flower Shop, Inc.. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14738 *8-I0 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The law does not require a formal appearance/"); Richardson 
Greenshields Securities, Inc. v. IntM Petroleum Corp., 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20974 *26 
(S.D.N.Y) ("Although IPC did not formally appear in this action . . ., IPC's ongoing 
settlement negotiations with Richardson clearly represented an informal response to the 
litigation."). Arbogast fails to cite to a single authority in the 2nd Circuit showing even 
slight criticism of the majority approach—let alone approval of the minority view. 
Regarding the 8lh and 9th Circuits, it is unclear from Arbogast's brief whether it is 
disputing that courts in these circuits follow the majority view, which they 
unquestionably do, or simply suggesting that they have a more rigorous standard for 
finding the informal contacts constitute an appearance. If the former, it has failed to cite 
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to any cases so holding or to show that any of the myriad cases cited by River Crossings 
do not demonstrate that these circuits have adopted the majority view. Many more cases 
from these circuits could have been cited. 
Assuming that Arbogast is simply arguing that the 8 and 9 Circuits follow a 
more rigorous standard, River Crossings likewise disagrees. Arbogast did not cite to a 
single case from the 8lh Circuit supporting that proposition and the cases cited from the 
9l Circuit follow the same standard as the other circuits, namely, that in order for 
informal contacts to constitute an appearance under the federal rules, they must show a 
clear intent or purpose to defend the suit. This is a highly fact-specific inquiry. In certain 
circumstances, a single telephone call may suffice while in other circumstances, more 
extensive communications will not. The majority authorities are all in line with this 
standard. 
Finally, although Arbogast suggests that the 10th and 11th Circuits have not yet 
reached the issue, in fact, courts from both circuits have adopted the majority view in 
defining an appearance under the federal rules. For example, in HFR, Inc. v. Hildyard, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91797 *22-24 (D. Kan.), the defendant had faxed a letter to 
plaintiffs counsel disputing his liability in the matter but did not file a formal response to 
the complaint or appear before the court. In considering whether the defendant had 
appeared for purposes of the federal rules, the court noted that the "prevailing view is that 
the rule applies not only to parties who have formally appeared, but also to those who 
have otherwise indicated to the moving party a clear purpose to defend the suit." Id. at 
*23. More importantly, citing to Tenth Circuit appellate case law, the court further 
401537v 1 6 ' 
declared that "[gliven the well settled federal policy favoring the resolution of lawsuits 
on their merits, the court believes that the Tenth Circuit would adopt this prevailing 
view." Id. at *24 (emphasis added); see also Ryan Transp. Serv. v. Paschall Servs.. 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2141 (D. Kan.) (holding that a stricken motion to extend time 
constituted an appearance because "courts have held that 'appearing' in an action need 
not be limited to a formal filing in court"). 
Courts in the 1 llh Circuit have also followed the majority approach. For example, 
in CargilL Inc. v. Cohen, 115 F.R.D. 259 (M.D. Ga. 1987), the court expressly adopted 
the majority view, stating that the "appearance required by the rule has been broadly 
defined and is not limited to a formal court appearance." Id. at 261. 
In summary, the federal circuits are replete with cases expressly adopting and 
following the majority view. Although difficult to believe given the sheer number of 
cases already cited by River Crossings, there are many more cases out there which also 
could have been cited. In stark contrast, Arbogast has identified only two cases 
nationwide that follow the so-called minority view, one of which comes from a district 
court in a circuit whose appellate court has rejected the minority view. 
Of the twelve federal circuits, including the 10 Circuit, only one has clearly 
dissented from the majority7 approach. Yet, Arbogast urges this court to reject the 
wisdom of virtually every federal court to consider the issue and instead follow the lone 
dissenting circuit in its resistance to the oft-stated policies underpinning the federal 
rules—namely, to abandon the restrictive interpretation of rules which prevent the fair 
hearing of cases on their merits. 
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B. The Relevant Federal Rules and Utah Rules are Perfectly Consistent. 
Contrary to Arbogast's assertions, the relevant portions of the Utah and Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure related to this issue are perfectly consistent. Rule 5 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure requires service of all "pleadings and other papers" on every 
party, including ua party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(B). Rule 5 of the Federal Rules also requires service of all "pleadings 
and other papers'" on every party, except that "[n]o service is required on a party who is 
in default for failure to appear. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(l)-(2). 
These provisions are substantively indistinguishable. This Court has held that the 
"federal interpretation [of the notice requirements under rule 5] is persuasive in light of 
the fact that our rule 5 is 'substantially similar to federal rule 5.'" Lund v. Brown, 2000 
UT 755 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000). This Court may therefore freely rely on federal case 
law in construing the term "appearance" under the Utah Rules. 
Furthermore, although many of the federal cases construing the term "appearance" 
under the federal rules have arisen under Federal Rule 55(b)(2). rather than Rule 5(a), 
courts have interpreted the term identically under both rules. E.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 142 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996) ("This discussion of appearances is drawn 
from case law on Rule 55(b)(2) appearances . . . . Rule 5(a) appearances will be treated 
the same, as both 55(b)(2) and 5(a) involve defendants who at one time appeared, but 
later defaulted.") 
For purposes of this discussion, it is irrelevant that Rule 55(b)(2) of the Utah and 
Federal Rules are not identical because this case arises under Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules. 
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Rule 55(b)(2) is invoked only to the extent that courts look to interpretations of the term 
"appearance*' under that rule for guidance in interpreting the term "appearance** under 
Rule 5(a). Furthermore, the only substantive distinction between the Utah and Federal 
Rules is that Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules sets forth a three-day notice requirement. 
whereas the Utah Rules are silent on how many days in advance notice is required prior 
to entry of default. Consequently, this Court can rely on case law interpreting the term 
"appearance'* under both Rule 5(a) and Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules for guidance in 
defining what constitutes an "appearance'' under Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
II. THE LANGUAGE OF, AND POLICIES BEHIND, RULE 5(A) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE MANDATE ADOPTION OF THE 
MAJORITY APPROACH. 
Notwithstanding the overwhelming case law adopting the majority interpretation 
of the corresponding federal rules, and this Court's prior admonition to look to case law 
interpreting Federal Rule 5(a). Arbogast argues that the rules of statutory construction 
require this Court to confine the term "appearance" in under Utah Rule 5(a) to so-called 
"formal" appearances. (Appellee Br. at 20.) Yet, the term "formaF appears nowhere 
within the plain language of Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules or the Federal Rules. Nor can 
there be found any distinction between so-called formal and informal appearances within 
the language of those rules. The vast majority of federal courts construing virtually the 
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same language in the Federal Rules have found nothing in the text to compel them to 
limit the term "appearance" to a formal one.2 
Arbogast likewise argues that only a "formal5" appearance is sufficient under Rule 
5(a) because that has been the "traditional" view. (Appellee Br. at 20) (emphasis added). 
This argument completely misses the point. Ironically, many of the courts adopting the 
majority view begin their analysis with this same word: "Traditionally, an appearance 
requires some filing with or actual physical appearance before the court." See, e.g.. Stan-
Consulting, Inc. v. Global Resources Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90994 *7 
(M.D.N.C); Caesar v. Firstbank Puerto Rico, 49 V.I. 1041, 1045 (D. V.I. 2008). That 
sentence is then immediately followed with "however" and an explanation of the modern 
approach of flexibly and liberally construing the procedural rules in the interest of justice. 
In construing the procedural rales, the "traditional" approach is of little value when faced 
with the current "policy underlying the modernization of federal procedure, namely, the 
abandonment or relaxation of restrictive rules to prevent a hearing of cases on their 
merits." HFR, Inc. v. Hildvard, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91797 *23 (D. Kan. 2007) 
(emphasis added). Therefore, although fully acknowledging the traditional view of 
appearance under the rules, federal courts nationwide have not felt constrained by 
"tradition" from embracing the progressive view of fairness and equity favored by the 
majority. 
2
 In fact, Arbogast contradicts itself and the rules of statutory construction by 
arguing that the Court must restrict the plain language of the rules by inserting sua sponte 
a term that is found nowhere within the plain language of the rule, which would 
drastically curtail the application of the notice requirements under the rules. 
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Arbogast further argues that confining the term "appearance" to formal ones 
would not thwart the modern, equitable policies underlying the rules because Rule 60(b) 
is waiting in the wings to provide recourse to the truly deserving. (Appellee Br. at 23.) 
What Arbogast fails to appreciate is that if this Court were to hold that only formal 
appearances count under the rules, then even a defendant who had engaged in lengthy 
settlement negotiations, repeatedly sought extensions and conversed with opposing 
counsel, and otherwise clearly and even explicitly declared its intention to defend the 
suit—but alas had not "formally5' appeared—would have no recourse whatsoever under 
Rule 60(b) absent other qualifying circumstances. That is precisely what has happened in 
this case. 
If on the other hand, Arbogast is suggesting that actions constituting an informal 
appearance are currently grounds for setting aside a default judgment under the 
"excusable neglect" provision of Rule 60(b)—even if not requiring notice under Rule 
5(a)—then that "bright line" and reliability that Arbogast claims for its minority approach 
would be entirely illusory. If an informal appearance already potentially justifies reversal 
as excusable neglect under Rule 60(b), then Arbogast cannot be heard to complain about 
the uncertainty and mayhem that would result if this Court more broadly interpreted 
"appearance" to require setting side of a default under Rule 60(b) if entered without 
notice. 
Contrary to Arbogast5s claims, defining "appearance55 more liberally would not 
render Rule 60(b) superfluous. Rule 55(c) already provides that if a default judgment is 
wrongly entered, such as through lack of notice, then the proper mechanism is a Rule 
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60(b) motion. See Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c). The mechanism for sening aside a default 
judgment would therefore remain entirely unchanged. 
Furthermore, Arbogast's predictions of doom and gloom for courts and their clerks 
are simply unfounded scare tactics. Court clerks would still have a "bright-line rule" to 
follow in determining from the face of the docket whether entry of default appears 
proper. If the defendant has not filed a response, then the clerk could enter default as is 
currently done. It is then the burden of the defaulted party to file an appropriate motion 
by explaining why facts unknown to the clerk warrant setting aside the default—just as is 
currently done when a complaint or summons was improperly served or when an 
extension of time to respond had been granted. Then, as is also currently done, the court, 
and not the clerk, would determine whether the facts of a particular case showed that an 
appearance arose by implication, warranting a setting aside of the default. 
Holding that an "appearance" can arise by implication would therefore not alter 
any current court procedures—it would merely clarify that such actions constitute 
additional grounds for setting aside a default under Rule 55 or 60(b). In so doing, this 
Court would help alleviate the uncertainty that exists as to whether lack of notice to those 
who have informally appeared justifies, or even mandates, the setting aside of a default 
judgment under Rule 60(b). It would also provide additional, well-needed 
encouragement to the lower courts to flexibly and liberally construe the procedural 
rules—particularly when faced with default judgments which are "not favored by the 
courts nor are they in the interest of justice and fair play." Heathman v. Fabian & 
Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189 (1962). 
401537v 1 1 2 
Adopting the majority approach would also further Utah's off-stated policy against 
default judgments by acting as an additional safeguard against unintentional defaults. 
This would in turn alleviate much of the burden currently felt by courts, which are 
frequently petitioned to set aside defaults that could have been avoided had notice been 
given. 
III. THE MAJORITY DEFINITION OF THE TERM "APPEARANCE" 
UNDER THE PROCEDURAL RULES IS FAR MORE CONSISTENT 
WITH UTAH LAW. 
A. Utah Rules of Professional Practice. 
By adopting the majority approach, this Court would comfortably reconcile the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure with the Utah Rules of Professional Practice. Rule 14-
301(16) states as follows: 
Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a default without first 
notifying other counsel whose identity is known, unless their 
clients' legitimate rights could be adversely affected. 
Id. (emphasis added). By complying with this rule and "notifying other counsel whose 
identify is known" before causing entry of default, counsel would without exception also 
be in full compliance with the majority view of Rule 5(a). In stark contrast, the minority 
view of Rule 5(a) would place unwary counsel in the untenable position of complying 
with the letter of Rule 5(a) while at the same time violating the rules of professional 
practice. According to the Utah Court of Appeals, this is precisely what counsel for 
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Arbogast has done in this case. Arbogast v. River Crossings, LLC. 2008 UT App 277 
1121 n.10, 191 P.3d39.3 
The majority approach provides much better predictability and reliability for 
counsel. They need not worry whether the contacts from opposing counsel are sufficient 
to constitute an appearance under Rule 5(a) because if the identity of counsel is merely 
known, then they must give notice prior to causing entry of default. 
The majority approach is also more consistent with the policies behind Rule 14-
30(16) of the Utah Rules of Professional Practice. Given the Court's adamant 
declarations that default judgments which are unot favored by the courts nor are they in 
the interest of justice and fair play," Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189 
(1962). this rule was surely intended to alleviate much of the unfairness and injustice 
caused by the unnoticed entry of default. Furthermore, if. as Arbogast suggests, the 
policy behind this rule is also to "diminish the number of defaults filed upon parties who 
may have a valid reason to later allege excusable neglect, surprise or mistaken under Rule 
60." then the majority approach much more fully implements this equitable and prudent 
policy—while the minority view runs directly counter to it. (See Appellee's Br. at 29.) 
The majority approach followed by eleven federal circuits is therefore more in harmony 
If, as Arbogast concedes, Rule 14-30(16) already requires notice to opposing 
counsel for even the most nominal, minimal contact identifying them, then Arbogast's 
complaints about the earth-shattering changes that the majority approach would wreak on 
courts, clerks, and counsel are entirely without merit. The only consideration before the 
court then should be whether to follow the minority definition of "appearance" or the 
modern liberal approach. 
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with the Utah Rules of Professional Practice than the minority approach espoused by 
Arbogast. 
B. Utah case law. 
As explained in detail in its opening brief, the decisions by this Court in Central 
Bank & Trust Co v. Jensen. 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982), and Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 
75. are most consistent with the majority approach followed nearly universally by the 
federal circuits. Surely it cannot be said that either Central Bank or Lund mandates 
adoption of the minority approach favored by Arbogast. Neither of these cases even 
acknowledges, much less analyzes, the ample case law advocating a liberal view of 
"appearance" under the corresponding federal rules. River Crossings certainly does not 
suggest that the Court in those cases "ignored its judicial responsibilities," as claimed by 
Arbogast. but merely that the issue was not before the Court or apparently briefed by the 
parties. Given the limited time and resources of the Court, issues not briefed are 
understandably often not addressed. 
Furthermore, it is ironic that Arbogast criticizes River Crossings' reading of the 
Central Bank and Lund cases as "pure speculation" in the absence of an express 
statement adopting the majority view, and then in next breath states that "it appears from 
both Central Bank and Lund [that] Utah has in fact adopted" the minority approach— 
again without any express statement of that fact. (Appellee's Br. at 27.) In truth, neither 
case expressly adopts either the majority or the minority approach because the question 
of which approach should be adopted in Utah was not before the Court. However, for the 
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reasons explained in depth in River Crossings' opening brief, the majority approach is 
more consistent with Utah law. 
IV. UNDER THE MAJORITY APPROACH, RIVER CROSSINGS WAS ENTITLED 
TO NOTICE PRIOR TO ENTRY OF DEFAULT. 
As set forth in the Court's order, the sole issue before this Court is whether the 
court of appeals erred in its determination of what constitutes an appearance for purposes 
of Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently. River Crossings did not 
brief the issues of whether, under the majority approach. River Crossings appeared in the 
case and, if so. whether Arbogast gave notice prior to causing entry of default. However, 
because Arbogast argued both of these issues in its brief, River Crossings will attempt to 
address them briefly herein. 
A. River Crossings Appeared in this Case. 
Under the majority approach, any act that shows a "clear purpose to defend the 
suit" constitutes an "appearance" under the rules. H.F. Livermore Corp. v. 
Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder L., 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curium). This 
standard has also been described as "any objective manifestation of an intent to defend or 
contest the action," Mobil Oil Co. v. Jimenez. 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26981 *7 (4th Cir. 
1991) (unpub.), "an indication in some way of an intent to pursue a defense," N.Y. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996), or "defendants seeking, taking or 
agreeing to some steps or proceedings in the cause beneficial to himself or detrimental to 
plaintiff." Heleasco Seventeen, Inc. v. Drake, 102 F.R.D. 909, 912 (D. Del. 1984). 
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Courts have further held that this is a "relatively low threshold.** N.Y. Life. 84 
F.3d at 14] (emphasis added). 
[A] court usually will try to find that there has been an 
appearance by defendant, which has the effect of requiring 
that notice of the application for a default be given. 
Wright, Miller & Kane, 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc: Civil 3d § 2686 (emphasis added). 
The long list of cases cited by River Crossings in its briefs plainly demonstrates 
this low threshold. (See Appellant's Opening Br. at 8-12; Reply Br. section I. supra.) 
Numerous courts have found that a single telephone call or letter requesting an 
extension—or even merely disputing the claim—constituted an appearance. See. e.g.. 
N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown. 84 F.3d 137, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1996); Hutton v. Fisher, 359 
F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966); Trust Co. Bank v. Tingen-Millford Drapery Co.. Inc.. 119 
F.R..D. 21, 22-23 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (finding appearance even though extension not 
granted). Courts also have frequently found an appearance in cases where there had been 
any settlement negotiations. See, e.g., Starr Consulting, Inc. v. Global Resources Corp., 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90994 *7 (M.D.N.C); CSB Corp. v. Cadillac Creative 
Advertising, Inc.. 136 F.R.D. 34, 35 (D. R.I. 1990). 
Arbogast filed its complaint in this case on January 10, 2006. Counsel for River 
Crossings subsequently and repeatedly requested, and was granted, extensions of time to 
make a settlement offer, to seek Utah counsel, or both. Arbogast, 2008 UT App 277 ^ 3. 
The parties then engaged in multiple, ongoing settlement negotiations through at least 
June 2006, during which time counsel for Arbogast promised River Crossings that he 
would not seek default without first notifying them. Id. ffi| 3, 28 n.7. Again on July 25, 
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River Crossings' managing member sent an e-mail to Arbogast's principal, requesting 
that Arbogast's principal call River Crossings' managing member in order to "discuss the 
direction of [the] lawsuit." Id. |^ 5. Six days later, Arbogast obtained a certificate of 
default from the court clerk without notifying or serving River Crossings. Ld. River 
Crossings was awaiting a response to its email when it learned of the default judgment 
entered against it. 
The substantial, continuous, and ongoing contact and settlement negotiations 
between River Crossings and Arbogast in this case plainly demonstrate River Crossings* 
intent to defend, and hopefully resolve, the claim. These extensive contacts go far 
beyond the single telephone calls that numerous federal courts have found sufficient to 
constitute an appearance under the majority approach. 
Tellingly, Arbogast has never claimed that River Crossings expressed any intent to 
ignore the lawsuit or pursue delay tactics as a litigation strategy. To the contrary, River 
Crossings both expressly and implicitly expressed its intent to defend the suit. Given the 
reassurances of Arbogast's counsel—and River Crossings' continued attempts to settle 
the matter—River Crossings understood that negotiations were continuing and that 
Arbogast would not seek default. The fact that River Crossings had not yet engaged Utah 
counsel was not evidence of its intent to ignore the lawsuit—to the contrary, it was 
evidence that River Crossings was committed to settling the claims with Arbogast and 
saving the expense of hiring additional counsel. If this Court were to find lack of intent 
to defend from the mere fact that River Crossings had not yet hired local counsel— 
notwithstanding River Crossings' extensive contacts with Arbogast and its continuous 
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efforts to settle the case—it would hold River Crossings to a much higher standard than 
has been required by any other court following the majority approach. 
Under the majority approach, a "default judgment must normally be viewed as 
available only when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially 
unresponsive party." H.F. Livermore. 432 F.2d at 691. 
The common thread seems to be that if a party has 
expressed—explicitly or implicitly—an intent to defend 
(rather than an intent to ignore the lawsuit and default as a 
litigation strategy), then equity compels the plaintiff to give 
the defendant notice of a motion for a default judgment. 
Gould v. Financialweb.com. Inc.. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20917 (S.D.N.Y.) (emphasis 
added). Nothing in the record shows that River Crossings was unresponsive or ignored 
the lawsuit as a litigation strategy. In fact, the record is replete with evidence of River 
Crossings intent and pursuit of a defense and resolution of the claims. Pviver Crossings 
therefore appeared in the case and was entitled to notice of default from Arbogast under 
Rule 5. 
B. Arbogast Failed to Serve River Crossings with Notice of Default. 
Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 'expresses the general principle 
that notice of all proceedings [5 including default proceedings,] must be provided to all 
parties."5 Arbogast, 2008 UT App at U 12 (quoting Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ffi| 20-
27). Although no service need be made on parties in default for failure to appear, "a 
party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear must be served with all 
pleadings and papers" at the time of filing. Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(B); Arbogast, 2008 
UTH21. 
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Arbogast filed a certificate of default with the district court on July 31. 2006 and a 
request for entry of default judgment on August 11. 2006. Arbogast admittedly served 
neither on River Crossings. It therefore failed to satisfy the notice requirement under 
Rule 5(a). 
Arbogast claims that, despite its failure to serve River Crossings with the 
certificate of default or the request for entry of default judgment, it nevertheless satisfied 
the demands of Rule 5 when it sent a letter to River Crossings on June 29. 2006. which 
stated as follows: 
My client has previously granted your client an extension of 
time within which to answer the complaint. However, given 
the present state of the case. I am. on behalf of my client, 
hereby requesting that your client file an Answer to the 
complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter. 
However, Rule 5(a) requires actual service of the documents that were filed—not merely 
a letter saying that they might be filed or even were filed. Therefore, even if the June 29 
letter had expressly informed River Crossings that it intended to file for default—which it 
did not—it still would not have satisfied the service requirements of Rule 5. 
In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the June 29 letter did not even satisfy 
Arbogast's obligations under the Utah Rules of Professional Practice. 
We think, however, the applicable standard requires more 
than a prospective notice that a complaint will be due in 
twenty days. Otherwise, a summons, which by rule informs a 
defendant when an answer is due, see Utah R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1), 
would also be sufficient notice, and the applicable standard 
would have added little. We therefore interpret this particular 
standard as requiring notice after the allotted passage of time 
for filing an answer but before a party actually seeks to obtain 
the entry of default. 
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Id. at T| 21 n.10. Because Arbogast failed to serve the certificate of default and request for 
entry of default judgment on River Crossings, it directly violated Rule 5(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The default judgment entered against River Crossings must 
therefore be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should rely on the federal interpretation of Rule 5(a) in adopting the 
majority definition of "appearance." This approach more fully complies with Utah law 
and policy, which favor a fair and just hearing of each case on the merits. 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant River Crossings, LLC respectfully requests 
that the court of appeals' decision be reversed and remanded and that the default 
judgment against River Crossings be set aside. 
DATED this 4th day of March, 2009. 
VAN COTT, BAGLp*, CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
By: 
Scott M. Lilja 
Nicole M. Deforge 
Attorneys for River Crossings, LLC 
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